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Prosecuting the Press for Publishing Classified 
Information 
Geoffrey R. Stone 
For more than 215 years the United States has flourished in the ab-
sence of any federal legislation directly prohibiting the press from publish-
ing government secrets.  The absence of such legislation is no accident.  It 
clearly fulfills the promise of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press.”  
Of course, the First Amendment is not an absolute.  The press may be 
held accountable for publishing libel, obscenity, false advertising, and the 
like.  As the Supreme Court observed more than sixty years ago, “such ut-
terances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”  
Government secrets are something else entirely.  There is nothing 
about matters labeled “government secrets” that inherently makes their dis-
semination “no essential part of any exposition of ideas” and of only “slight 
value as a step to truth.”  To the contrary, the publication of such informa-
tion may be extraordinarily valuable to the proper functioning of a self-
governing society.  The very notion of punishing the press for publishing 
information because the government wants to keep that information secret 
runs counter to the most fundamental tenets of public accountability. 
Of course, there are secrets and there are secrets.  It may be helpful to 
distinguish three different types of secrets.  First, there are what we might 
call “illegitimate” government secrets.  What renders such secrets “illegiti-
mate” is that their secrecy does not in any way further the public good.  
They are secret because someone in government is attempting to hide an 
embarrassing or damning truth from public scrutiny.  We know from both 
human nature and common experience that government officials may some-
times try to shield from public view their misjudgments, incompetence, 
venality, cupidity, and corruption.  To protect their own interests, such offi-
cials may assert that secrecy is essential to the national security.  Needless 
to say, this is illegitimate in a self-governing society.  It is vital in a consti-
tutional democracy that such deception must be ferreted out and exposed. 
Second, there are what we might call “legitimate but newsworthy” 
government secrets.  The disclosure of some government secrets might 
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harm our national security, and the government certainly has a legitimate 
interest in preventing such harm.  But the public disclosure of such secrets 
may also have salutary and substantial “value as a step to truth.” Indeed, 
this is often the case.  For example, the publication of secret information 
that Army rifles routinely malfunction might be both harmful and beneficial 
to the national interest.  That this publication might harm the national inter-
est from one perspective does not preclude it from serving the national in-
terest from another.  Similarly, the publication of information that the secu-
rity around our nuclear power plants is inadequate both threatens and serves 
the national interest.  In such situations, which are quite common, it is often 
difficult to know with any confidence which effect predominates. 
Third, there are what we might call “legitimate and non-newsworthy” 
government secrets.  The public disclosure of such secrets might harm the 
national security but have only “slight value as a step to truth.”  An example 
would be public disclosure that the government has broken the enemy’s 
code, where the disclosure serves no legitimate public interest.  Of course, 
whether any particular disclosure actually furthers a legitimate public inter-
est is often a matter of dispute, so it may be easier to define this category in 
the abstract than to apply it in practice.  
A central challenge to a free society is to distinguish among these three 
types of secrets.  In principle, the government should never be able to pun-
ish the publication of “illegitimate” secrets and should be able to punish the 
publication of “legitimate and non-newsworthy” secrets.  The middle cate-
gory, which is no doubt the largest, is also the most difficult to assess in 
terms of striking the proper balance.  Moreover, this taxonomy is easier to 
state than to implement.  When it comes to distinguishing among these 
three types of secrets in the real world, particularly in the context of crimi-
nal prosecutions of the press, the problems of complexity and vagueness 
can be overwhelming.  
To provide reasonable guidance to the press, avoid chilling the publi-
cation of information that is important to the public interest, and limit the 
dangers of unchecked prosecutorial discretion, we need clear, simple rules.  
Such rules, by definition, will be imperfect.  They will inevitably protect 
either too much or too little expression; they will inevitably protect either 
too much or too little secrecy.  This is a dilemma. 
This brings me back to the lessons of history.  As I noted earlier, for 
more than 215 years the United States has resolved this dilemma by not
prohibiting the press from publishing government secrets.  Perhaps even 
more important, there has not been a single instance in the history of the 
United States in which the press’s publication of a “legitimate but newswor-
thy” government secret has gravely harmed the national interest.  The les-
son of this experience is that the best course for the United States is to re-
frain from prohibiting the press to publish “legitimate but newsworthy” 
government secrets.  Although one can imagine hypotheticals in which such 
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a publication could seriously harm the national interest, more than two cen-
turies of experience has proved that the threat of such prosecutions is un-
necessary, and would do more harm than good.  
For the government to wield the power to prosecute the press for such 
publications would give government officials enormous capacity to intimi-
date and threaten the press and thereby undermine its vital role in our de-
mocratic system.  To grant government officials such authority would seri-
ously jeopardize the ability and willingness of the press to expose to public 
scrutiny what should be exposed.  
I return now to my third category of government secrets – those that 
are “legitimate and non-newsworthy.”  The publication of these secrets 
could harm the national interest without contributing to informed public 
debate.  Thus, in principle, the government should be able to prohibit the 
public disclosure of such secrets.  The problem, though, is that it is not easy 
even to “know such secrets when we see them.”  The very concept of “non-
newsworthy” is elusive. Although that is a genuine difficulty, it is not nec-
essarily an insurmountable obstacle.  It should be possible reasonably to 
limit the uncertainty by clearly and narrowly defining precisely what is 
prohibited. 
It may be useful in this regard to work backwards from the paradigm 
example of the government secret that should not be published.  Suppose a 
newspaper publishes the fact that the United States has broken the al Qaeda 
code, and as a consequence the terrorists change their cipher.  Suppose also 
that there is no legitimate public interest in the publication of this informa-
tion.  That is, the publication does not reveal any possible illegality, incom-
petence, venality, or misjudgment by government officials.  
This example embodies two factors that might help define the scope of 
a constitutionally permissible criminal prohibition.  First, the newspaper 
knew or was reckless in not knowing that the publication of this informa-
tion would create a clear and imminent danger of a grave harm to the na-
tional security.  Second, the newspaper knew or was reckless in not know-
ing that the publication of this information was “non-newsworthy.”  
With these two elements in place, it might be possible to enact a care-
fully crafted law that addresses the most serious dangers to the national 
security, while at the same time protecting the freedom of the press and the 
compelling national interest in free and robust debate and discussion of 
matters of legitimate public concern.  
But would it be good public policy to enact such a law?  On balance, I 
think not.  Once again, I return to the lessons of history.  Even if such a law 
would be constitutional, I doubt it would be either necessary or wise.  In 
215 years of experience, the problem has never actually arisen.  And even if 
some might disagree with that assessment, the number of instances about 
which there might be disagreement can easily be counted on one hand.  
This would be a law in search of a problem.  This is never a sound basis for 
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legislation and certainly not in dealing with a freedom as precious as the 
freedom of the press.  I remain convinced that the Congress had it right in 
1917.  Even a law drawn this narrowly would cause more mischief than it is 
worth. Some things are simply best left alone. 
I do not in any way mean to suggest that the government has no le-
gitimate interest in keeping military secrets.  Certainly, it does.  But the way 
to protect this interest is not by threatening to prosecute the press.  It is, 
rather, by preserving the confidentiality of the information by implementing 
effective (and constitutionally permissible) regulations governing public 
employees who unlawfully leak such information.  As the Yale constitu-
tional scholar Alexander Bickel once observed, this is surely a “disorderly 
situation,” but it may be the best we can do. If we give the government too 
much power to punish the press, we risk too great a sacrifice of public de-
bate; if we give the government too little power to control secrecy “at the 
source,” we risk too great a sacrifice of essential secrecy.  The American 
solution has been to reconcile the irreconcilable values of secrecy and free-
dom by protecting an expansive right of the press to publish and a strong 
power of the government to prohibit leaks.  The American solution may be 
unruly, but it has served the nation well. 
